![]() ![]() Army published Field Manual 31-21: “Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare,” which established the doctrinal foundation for Special Forces units. Clearly, there had been enough time for the Navy to have delegated such “special missions” to others had it chosen to do so but the Navy didn’t. The PACFLT study was promulgated 18 months after the fact, while UDT men were still adapting and conducting expanded operations. The major hiccup was that as early as August 1950, Commander, Naval Forces Far East had already committed the UDTs to “more advanced or different” combat operations. ![]() A 1952 Pacific Fleet study concluded: “UDTs PACFLT are not adequately prepared by training or with equipment for operations more advanced or different from those of World War II.” Perhaps, but not so fast. ![]() This expanded tasking took the UDTs beyond the limits of their traditional World War II training, equipment, and doctrine. Marine Corps on a menu of special operations and activities. Using waterborne entry methods, UDT men conducted numerous direct-action raids, trained and worked with South Korean frogmen, and worked closely with the CIA, British, and U.S. The underpinning of a SEAL team concept actually began to materialize with UDT operations during the Korean War. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 found the UDTs mission essential, but unprepared for new special operations with which they would quickly be tasked. ![]() Austere budgets also hindered expanded training and development of new concepts and equipment. Although they survived doctrinally, the Navy’s post-World War II manpower reductions resulted in cutting the Underwater Demolition Teams by almost 95 percent. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |